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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant CBS Corporation, which during the time 
relevant to this appeal was known as Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation ("Westinghouse"), appeals from the district 
court order entered January 10, 1997, remanding this 
matter to state court.1 According to Westinghouse, the 
district court erred in remanding the case because its 
petition properly invoked removal jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1442(a)(1). Inasmuch as 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d) bars 
our exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the remand order, 
we will dismiss this appeal. 
 
The germane facts and procedural history are as follows. 
Gerald Feidt and his wife, Arlene Feidt, filed this products 
liability suit against various defendants including 
Westinghouse in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden 
County, on July 9, 1996. Feidt alleged that, while working 
aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise at the Newport News Ship 
Building and Dry Dock Company, he was exposed to 
asbestos products including insulation on turbines 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On March 16, 1998, the clerk of this court granted CBS's motion to 
change the caption so that it, rather than Westinghouse, is the 
appellant. Nevertheless, as a matter of convenience, we will refer to 
Westinghouse as the appellant. 
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manufactured by Westinghouse. The complaint asserted 
that Feidt's exposure to asbestos caused him to suffer from 
malignant mesothelioma, a fatal cancer of the lining of the 
lung. Feidt died from this condition during the pendency of 
this action. 
 
On September 13, 1996, Westinghouse removed this 
action to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey pursuant to section 1442(a)(1), which is 
commonly referred to as the federal officer removal statute. 
Subsequently, Feidt filed a motion to remand in the district 
court. The court granted the motion, filing a letter opinion 
and order (1) remanding the case to state court; and (2) 
certifying the issue for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). In its opinion, the district court 
construed the complaint against Westinghouse as being 
based solely on its failure to warn persons exposed to its 
product of the dangers of exposure to asbestos. The district 
court stayed the remand and all other proceedings until the 
first of the following events: all the parties failed to apply 
within ten days to this court to entertain the appeal; this 
court adjudicated or refused to entertain the appeal; or a 
party showed good cause for the vacation of the stay. 
 
Westinghouse then filed a timely petition for permission 
to appeal the remand order which we granted on March 26, 
1997. Westinghouse acknowledges that section 1447(d) 
bars this court from reviewing the district court's order to 
the extent it remands Feidt's claims against Westinghouse 
which allege a failure to warn. Br. at 7 n.3. However, 
Westinghouse argues that Feidt asserted design defect, 
manufacturing defect, and breach of warranty claims, 
based not only on Westinghouse's failure to warn but also 
on other conduct. Westinghouse contends that Feidt's 
assertion of these non-failure to warn claims, which it 
argues that the district court ignored, made this case 
removable under section 1442(a)(1). It reasons that the 
district court, by ignoring these claims, failed to discharge 
its duty to consider all bases for the exercise of jurisdiction 
under section 1442(a)(1), thus rendering the jurisdictional 
bar in section 1447(d) inapplicable. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
Except for civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1443, section 1447(d) provides that "[a]n order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 
Although this bar to the reviewability of remand orders 
appears broad and unyielding, the courts have carved 
various exceptions from it and therefore will review certain 
remand orders. 
 
Most notably, 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) limits the jurisdictional 
bar of section 1447(d) so that only those "remand orders 
issued under S 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified 
therein . . . are immune from review under S 1447(d)." 
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346, 
96 S.Ct. 584, 590 (1976), abrogated on other grounds, 
(1996); see also Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 
U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439 (1977). Section 1447(c) provides for 
remand on the basis of either a procedural defect or lack of 
jurisdiction; thus, section 1447(d) prohibits review of 
remand orders based on the district court's finding of either 
of those conditions. Moreover, section 1447(d) prohibits 
review of remand orders "whether erroneous or not and 
whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary 
writ." Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 589. 
 
Accordingly, we repeatedly have held that section 1447(d) 
bars review of remand orders based upon the types of 
subject matter jurisdictional issues which district courts 
routinely make under section 1447(c). See Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 
1995); Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 682 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 
1993); In re TMI Litig. Cases Cons. II, 940 F.2d 832, 844 (3d 
Cir. 1991); see also Hudson United Bank v. Litenda 
Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, in 
In re TMI, we noted "that the subject matter jurisdictional 
inquiry contemplated by section 1447(c) is limited to the 
question of whether Congress intended that the types of 
actions at issue be subject to removal." In re TMI, 940 F.2d 
at 846. 
 
We conclude that the district court made such a 
determination and therefore remanded the case because it 
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found that a basic element of removal jurisdiction was 
lacking. Consequently, section 1447(d) precludes our review 
of the remand order. 
 
As we have indicated, Westinghouse removed this case 
pursuant to section 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal 
statute, which permits a federal officer, or person acting 
under such an officer, to remove to federal court any action 
brought against him in state court for conduct performed 
under federal direction. To establish removal jurisdiction 
under section 1442(a)(1), a defendant such as 
Westinghouse must establish that (1) it is a "person" within 
the meaning of the statute; (2) the plaintiff 's claims are 
based upon the defendant's conduct "acting under" a 
federal office; (3) it raises a colorable federal defense; and 
(4) there is a causal nexus between the claims and the 
conduct performed under color of a federal office. See Mesa 
v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129, 109 S.Ct. 959, 965 (1989); 
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 
1817 (1969). 
 
The district court held that 
 
       [a] fair reading of the Complaint and the activities of 
       Westinghouse alleged on the record generated before 
       this Court demonstrates that plaintiffs' claims against 
       Westinghouse are predicated solely upon the 
       defendant's failure to warn persons such as the plaintiff 
       . . . of the dangers of contact with asbestos-laden 
       thermal insulation used with the turbines which 
       Westinghouse manufactured. While different claims on 
       different bases are asserted against other defendants, 
       this is the sole potentially viable claim against 
       Westinghouse. 
 
Slip op. at 3 (emphasis added). Based upon this 
construction of the complaint and its understanding of the 
record, the district court analyzed the requirements of the 
federal officer removal statute with reference only to claims 
against Westinghouse based upon its alleged failure to 
warn. 
 
The district court found that Westinghouse was acting 
under the direction, control and supervision of an officer of 
the United States and presented a colorable claim to the 
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government contractor defense. However, the district court 
found that removal was inappropriate because 
Westinghouse failed to establish the necessary causal 
connection between the conduct upon which Feidt's claim 
of state law liability was based -- the failure to warn -- and 
the conduct Westinghouse allegedly performed under 
federal direction -- its federal military contract obligations. 
In particular, the district court held that Westinghouse did 
not present evidence that the Navy prohibited it from 
issuing warnings with respect to the use of asbestos 
insulation. 
 
After finding that Westinghouse's removal petition did not 
establish the requisite causal connection for federal officer 
removal jurisdiction, the district court approved the policy 
analysis in Good v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 914 F. 
Supp. 1125, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In particular, the district 
court quoted the section of Good in which the court found 
that the litigation in federal court of the government 
contractor defense would not further the purposes 
underlying the federal officer removal statute, namely the 
threat to the enforcement of the implementation of a federal 
policy and the concern for state court manipulation of 
federal defenses. See Good, 914 F. Supp. at 1131. The 
district court found that this conclusion was valid in this 
case and further supported its remand determination. 
 
Westinghouse makes two arguments that the district 
court did not base its remand order upon one of the two 
grounds enumerated in section 1447(c), and that therefore 
section 1447(d) does not prohibit our review. First, 
Westinghouse contends that the district court did not base 
its remand order upon a routine jurisdictional decision 
issued under section 1447(c) because the court "ignored" 
the design defect, manufacturing defect, and breach of 
warranty claims in Feidt's complaint which were based on 
conduct other than the failure to warn. Westinghouse 
therefore concludes that the district court did not make a 
jurisdictional determination with respect to Westinghouse's 
non-failure to warn claims. Second, Westinghouse contends 
that the district court remanded the case for policy rather 
than jurisdictional reasons. 
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Section 1447(d), in prohibiting review of remand orders, 
contemplates that district courts may err in remanding 
cases. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 342, 96 S.Ct. at 589; 
Liberty Mutual, 48 F.3d at 750. Indeed, "[n]o matter how 
faulty we might consider the district court's reasoning or 
methods, section 1447(d) prohibits us from reviewing an 
action the district court was empowered to take, and one 
that Congress intended to be final." Liberty Mutual, 48 F.3d 
at 750-51.2 The district court's authority, indeed obligation, 
to determine whether a removal petition properly invokes 
its removal jurisdiction necessarily includes the authority to 
construe the complaint upon which the court makes its 
determination. Upon review of the district court decision, 
we find that the district court made a good-faith 
construction of the complaint and examination of the 
record and then concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d 1359, 
1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing district court's remand 
order to determine actual grounds for remand rather than 
accepting the court's reference to section 1447(c) or 
assertion of subject matter jurisdiction as rationale). 
 
Westinghouse's argument that the court disregarded 
some of Feidt's claims cannot change our result, as it was 
the court's duty to construe the complaint to ascertain the 
nature of Feidt's claims and clearly it did exactly that. At 
worst, the court made a mistake. This case certainly does 
not involve a situation in which the district court recited 
that it was remanding the case for lack of jurisdiction when 
its motive was otherwise. Therefore, we find that the district 
court's decision is a routine jurisdictional determination 
under section 1447(c), which section 1447(d) precludes us 
from reviewing. Because section 1447(d) contemplates that 
a district court may err in making a nonreviewable 
jurisdictional determination, we render no opinion 
regarding the proper construction of the complaint.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It would be bizarre to hold that a court of appeals could review a 
remand order only if erroneous, as in that circumstance the 
jurisdictional determination would be a merits determination. 
 
3. Although we render no opinion regarding the accuracy of the district 
court's construction of the complaint, we note that Feidt has represented 
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We now turn to Westinghouse's second argument, 
namely, that because the district court based its remand 
order upon policy considerations, the court did not issue its 
remand order pursuant to section 1447(c) and, therefore, 
section 1447(d) does not bar this appeal. It is clear that 
policy considerations such as an overcrowded docket and 
judicial economy are not valid bases for remand under 
section 1447(c). See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-46, 96 
S.Ct. at 590; see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712, 116 
S.Ct. at 1718 (holding that a remand order based upon 
abstention principles is not barred from appellate review by 
section 1447(d) because an "abstention-based remand order 
does not fall into either category of remand order described 
in S 1447(c)"); Archuleta, 131 F.3d at 1363 (noting that 
policy considerations such as judicial economy and the 
plaintiff 's choice of forum are not in themselves valid bases 
for remand under section 1447(c)); see also Ryan v. State 
Bd. of Elections, 661 F.2d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(noting that a properly removed case may not be remanded 
for discretionary reasons under section 1447(c)); Elrad v. 
United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 742, 743-44 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing Thermtron as holding that the district 
court may not remand for discretionary or policy reasons). 
However, the district court's mere mention of such 
considerations in the course of its discussion of its lack of 
jurisdiction does not automatically render the remand order 
appealable where the policy rationale is not the sole reason 
for remand. See Archuleta, 131 F.3d at 1363. 
 
As we discussed above, after finding that Westinghouse's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to this court and the district court that the gravamen of his complaint 
against Westinghouse is a liability claim based upon Westinghouse's 
failure to warn. Nevertheless, the district court did not base its 
jurisdictional conclusions on an attempt by Feidt to narrow his 
complaint. See Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993). In 
any event, if Feidt asserts in state court that liability should be 
imposed 
against Westinghouse based upon conduct other than its failure to warn, 
our opinion should not be understood to preclude Westinghouse from 
filing a second notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1446(b). At that 
time, Westinghouse would have the opportunity to present its arguments 
regarding removal jurisdiction with respect to those claims. 
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removal petition did not establish the requisite causal 
connection, the district court noted that removal in this 
case did not further the policies and purposes of section 
1442(a)(1). This policy discussion was not necessary 
because, after finding that Westinghouse's removal petition 
failed to establish the causal nexus required under section 
1442(a)(1), the district court was obligated to remand the 
case for lack of jurisdiction under section 1447(c). The 
discussion of the underlying policies therefore was not 
determinative, and this case is distinguishable from 
Thermtron, in which the district court remanded the case 
solely because of its overcrowded docket.4  
 
Finally, we reject Westinghouse's suggestion that, 
because the district court certified the district court 
jurisdictional issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b), and we 
granted leave to appeal, the analysis of the effect of section 
1447(d) somehow should be different from an analysis 
made in an appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The district 
court certified the ultimate jurisdictional issue involved in 
this case: "Was the present action removable by the 
defendant Westinghouse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1442(a)(1)?" Thereafter, we granted Westinghouse's 
petition for permission to appeal. 
 
Westinghouse cites no case law to support a holding that 
the bar of section 1447(d) does not apply where a district 
court certifies the order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) 
and a court of appeals grants leave to appeal. In fact, there 
is much authority that the certification of such an issue is 
inappropriate and does not circumvent the section 1447(d) 
jurisdictional bar. See In re TMI, 940 F.2d at 846 
(suggesting in dicta that review under section 1292(b) 
would not be available);5 Krangel v. General Dynamics 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. However, we recognize that a policy analysis is sometimes part of 
statutory interpretation. In the circumstances, we have no need to 
consider whether the policy discussion really was nothing more than an 
explication of the meaning of section 1442(a)(1) and thus could be 
regarded as part of the jurisdictional analysis. 
 
5. In In re TMI, after the district court certified an issue for appeal 
under 
section 1292(b), we granted leave to appeal. See In re TMI, 940 F.2d at 
836. However, In re TMI is distinguishable from this appeal and does not 
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Corp., 968 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
section 1447(d) precluded it from granting a section 1292(b) 
petition for permission to appeal); Ray v. American Nat'l 
Red Cross, 921 F.2d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same); In re 
Bear River Drainage Dist., 267 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 
1959) (holding that section 1292(b) does not apply to allow 
an appeal otherwise precluded by section 1447(d)); In re 
Rosenthal-Block China Corp., 278 F.2d 713, 714 (2d Cir. 
1960) (citing In re Bear River with approval). 
 
Moreover, 
 
       a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific 
       subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
alter our conclusion that certification and permission to appeal under 
section 1292(b) does not circumvent the jurisdictional bar of section 
1447(d). 
 
In In re TMI, the plaintiffs instituted suits in state court which became 
subject to the Price-Anderson Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2011 et seq., 
which created an express federal claim for nuclear accidents. See id. at 
835. Such claims were subject to removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2210(n)(2), and the defendants thereby removed the case to federal 
court. See id. at 835, 837. The In re TMI district court found that the 
Act 
was unconstitutional, and therefore the court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claim. See id. at 837-38. Thus, the district 
court remanded the case to the state court. See id. at 838. The district 
court then certified the issue of whether the Act was unconstitutional for 
immediate appeal to this court pursuant to section 1292(b). See id. In 
that case, we held that the district court's remand order was reviewable 
because the district court's decision was not a routine jurisdictional 
inquiry into the satisfaction of the removal requirements. See id. at 844. 
 
Here, the district court certified the question of whether Westinghouse 
had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the federal removal 
statute. Thus, the certification and permission for appeal under section 
1292(b) in this case concerns the very issue which Congress has 
precluded a court of appeals from reviewing -- whether a district court 
erred in finding that a defendant did not satisfy the elements for removal 
under the applicable statute. Thus, where section 1447(d) would 
preclude this court from reviewing the remand question concerned, 
certification and permission to appeal under section 1292(b) are 
improper. This result is consistent with In re TMI where section 1447(d) 
did not bar appellate jurisdiction over the issue certified. 
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       covering a more generalized spectrum. `Where there is 
       no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not 
       be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of 
       the priority of enactment.' 
 
Rodzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153, 96 
S.Ct. 1989, 1992 (1976) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483 (1974)); see also In 
re Guardianship of Penn, 15 F.3d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Section 1447(d) prohibits review of a particular type of 
district court order, namely a remand order under section 
1447(c), whereas section 1292(b) is a more general grant of 
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the jurisdictional bar of section 
1447(d) trumps the power to grant leave to appeal in 
section 1292(b). 
 
Finally, we point out that our Internal Operating 
Procedures provide that while a motions panel "may grant 
a motion to dismiss an appeal" for lack of jurisdiction, if a 
motions panel does not grant such a motion it refers the 
motion "without decision and without prejudice" to the 
merits panel. See I.O.P. 10.3.5. By a parity of reasoning, an 
order of a motions panel granting leave to appeal should 
not bar a merits panel from examining this court's 
jurisdiction. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
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